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The Limits of Police Interrogation: 
The Limits of the Charter 
Hon. Justice Gary T. Trotter* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A confession has long been recognized as a powerful piece of evidence 
in a criminal trial, a virtual “queen of proofs”.1 It is now well accepted 
that it is a “natural manifestation of human experience” that judges and 
juries generally accord great weight to confessions.2 As Cory J. explained 
in R. v. Hodgson:3 
It is because of the tremendous significance attributed to confessions 
and the innate realization that they could be obtained by improper means 
that the circumstances surrounding a confession have for centuries been 
carefully scrutinized to determine whether it should be admitted.4 
This concern for the proper limits of police interrogation has been 
galvanized by a growing body of literature that suggests that false 
confessions may play a significant role in wrongful convictions.5 Yet, 
despite the importance of police interrogation to the investigative process, 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms6 has had only a limited 
                                                                                                            
*
 Superior Court of Justice, Ontario. This paper is based partly on an earlier paper 
entitled, “Voluntariness in a Nutshell”, presented at the Ontario Bar Association Conference, The 
Ultimate Guide on Hearsay and Voluntariness, on February 3, 2007, in Toronto. 
1
 See Peter Brooks, Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature  
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), at 4. In extravagant terms, Brooks also writes: 
“Meanwhile, Western culture, most strikingly since the Romantic era to our day, has made 
confessional speech a prime mark of authenticity, par excellence the kind of speech in which the 
individual authenticates his inner truth.”  
2
 See R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at 460 (S.C.C.), per Cory J. 
3
 [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. 
No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 29 (S.C.C.), in which Charron J. said: “[A] confession is a very 
powerful item of evidence against an accused which, in and of itself, can ground a conviction.”  
4
 R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.), at 460 (S.C.C.). 
5
 See Christopher Sherrin, “False Confessions and Admissions in Canadian Law” (2005) 
30 Queen’s L.J. 601 and Gary T. Trotter, “False Confessions and Wrongful Convictions” (2003-2004)  
35 Ottawa L. Rev. 179.  
6
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, 
c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
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impact on what takes place inside the interrogation room. As Professor 
Lisa Dufraimont observes, “the common law rule excluding voluntary 
confessions remains the suspect’s best protection against coercive 
interrogation.”7 Of course, it would be an overstatement to say that the 
Charter has had no impact on interrogation. Rules have been developed 
under sections 10(a) and (b) of the Charter that place limits on the timing, 
and, to a very limited extent, the substantive content of interrogations. 
But limits on what transpires during an interrogation have been left 
largely to the dynamic common law confessions rule.8 
Some critics lament the fact that the law relating to interrogations 
seems to have been left behind by the Charter.9 For those who favour 
greater control over the interrogation process, the Charter is thought to 
promise more meaningful protection for detained persons. However, this 
proposition is debatable. There are many benefits associated with leaving 
the law of interrogation to the realm of the common law confessions 
rule, benefits that might be eroded by attempts to “Charter-ize” this area 
of the law. Moreover, given that Charter values are reflected in the 
modern common law confessions rule, it is doubtful that the law would 
develop in a more robust manner if it were to become more firmly 
rooted in the Charter. The majority of the Supreme Court essentially 
reached this conclusion in its recent judgment in R. v. Singh.10 
II. CHARTER RIGHTS IMPLICATED IN THE  
INTERROGATION PROCESS 
There are numerous rights under the Charter that might be said to be 
implicated in police interrogation. Section 10(a), which guarantees the 
right of a detainee to be “informed promptly of the reasons” for arrest 
                                                                                                            
7
 Lisa Dufraimont, “The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current Law 
and Future Directions”, in this volume, at 249. 
8
 There are numerous excellent treatments of the common law rule in Canada. See David 
Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 4th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005), Chapter 8; 
John Sopinka, Sidney Lederman & Alan W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2d ed. 
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1999) (and second edition supplement, 2004), Chapter 8; S.C. Hill et al., 
McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence, 4th ed. Looseleaf (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2003-), 
Chapter 8; and Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON: 
Thomson Carswell, 2005), at 134-43. 
9
 See Lisa Dufraimont, “The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current 
Law and Future Directions” in this volume and Don Stuart, “Oickle: The Supreme Court’s Recipe 
for Coercive Interrogation” (2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 188.  
10
 R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.). The implications of this decision 
are discussed below.  
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and detention, is a pre-condition to interrogation of a detained person. 
However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the section rather 
conservatively, with little in the way of consequences when breaches of 
the section are established.11 
The most obvious Charter right implicated in limiting interrogations 
is section 10(b) of the Charter, which guarantees the right to counsel to 
persons who are “detained”. Section 10(b) has generated a complex web of 
doctrine, addressing many aspects of the encounter between the police 
and a detained person.12 At the heart of the section 10(b) is the right 
against self-incrimination, a value pursued in many aspects of the 
jurisprudence of former Chief Justice Antonio Lamer, the architect of 
many of the early Supreme Court’s decisions applying the Charter to the 
criminal law.13 In the context of the right to counsel, Lamer C.J.C. said 
the following in R. v. Bartle:14 
 The purpose of the right to counsel guaranteed by s.10(b) of the 
Charter is to provide detainees with an opportunity to be informed of 
their rights and obligations under the law and, most importantly, to obtain 
advice on how to exercise those rights and fulfil those obligations:  
R. v. Manninen (1987), 34 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.), at pp. 391-3. This 
opportunity is made available because, when an individual is detained 
by state authorities, he or she is put in a position of disadvantage 
relative to the state. Not only has this person suffered a deprivation of 
liberty, but also this person may be at risk of incriminating him or 
herself. Accordingly, a person who is “detained” within the meaning 
of s. 10 of the Charter is in immediate need of legal advice in order to 
protect his or her right against self-incrimination and to assist him or 
her in regaining his or her liberty …15 (emphasis added) 
                                                                                                            
11
 The Court has addressed this section of the Charter on only a few occasions. See R. v. 
Greffe, [1990] S.C.J. No, 32, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.); R. v. Evans, [1991] S.C.J. No. 31, 63 C.C.C. 
(3d) 289 (S.C.C.); R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, 39 C.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Mann, 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.).  
12
 See Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON: 
Thomson Carswell, 2005), at 331-53. 
13
 There are many aspects of the criminal law that Lamer C.J.C. addressed with self -
incrimination in mind. One obvious area was s. 10(b) of the Charter. This theme also dominated his 
vision of the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2), starting in R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15,  
33 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). Chief Justice Lamer’s views on self-incrimination are explored in the 
context of when it is appropriate to re-open the Crown’s case and amend an information: see R. v. 
P. (M.B.), [1994] S.C.J. No. 27, 89 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.). 
14
 [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.).  
15
 R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at 300 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. 
Jones, [1994] S.C.J. No. 42, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 229 (S.C.C.). 
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From this theme, a number of duties have been imposed on the 
police, obligations that must be discharged before a detained individual 
may be questioned. These are called informational16 and implementational17 
duties. They are designed to further the objective of preventing the 
accused from incriminating himself. They comprise a set of procedural 
ground rules for interrogation. With one exception, they fall short of 
regulating the substance of an interrogation (in terms of the questions 
the police may ask and the tactics they may use). 
Until the police have discharged their implementational duties  
(i.e., to retain and instruct counsel), they must refrain from questioning18 
or otherwise attempting to elicit information19 from the detained person. 
This is essentially a “holding-off” period.20 However, once the detainee 
has had the opportunity to consult with counsel, subject to comments 
concerning section 7 of the Charter below, the police are free to question 
a detained person, even in the face of protestations that he or she does 
not wish to participate in the interview.21 This means that, while section 
10(b) provides protection against self-incrimination through access to 
counsel, it does not create a right not to be interviewed or interrogated 
by state officials. This puts a great premium on defence counsel giving 
advice to a detained person to warn him or her that the police may 
continue with their questioning when the call with counsel is completed. 
                                                                                                            
16
 Flowing from R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.), and other 
cases, the police must advise the detainee of the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. 
This includes the duty to advise of free legal advice and the availability of legal advice through a 
“1-800” service, in locations where it exists: see R. v. Brydges, [1990] S.C.J. No. 8, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 
330 (S.C.C.).  
17
 The police must provide a reasonable opportunity for the accused to consult with 
counsel (R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Baig, [1987] 
S.C.J. No. 77, 61 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.)) in private (R. v. Playford, [1987] O.J. No. 1107, 40 C.C.C. 
(3d) 142 (Ont. C.A.). 
18
 See R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.); R. v. Prosper, 
[1994] S.C.J. No. 72, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Brydges, [1990] S.C.J. No. 8, 53 
C.C.C. (3d) 330 (S.C.C.). 
19
 R. v. McKenzie, [2002] O.J. No. 3029, 167 C.C.C. (3d) 530 (Ont. C.A.).  
20
 R. v. Prosper, [1994] S.C.J. No. 72, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Lewis, 
[2007] O.J. No. 1784, 86 O.R. (3d) 46 (Ont. C.A.). Relying on R. v. Plaha, [2004] O.J. No. 3484, 
188 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), the Lewis Court found that the breach of this duty tainted 
statements taken shortly thereafter that were taken in compliance with s. 10(b). 
21
 See R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, 77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.), in which McLachlin J. 
(as she then was) held at 188: 
Presumably, counsel will inform the accused of the right to remain silent. If the police are 
not posing as undercover officers and the accused chooses to volunteer information, there 
will be no violation of the Charter. Police persuasion, short of denying the suspect the right 
to choose or depriving him of an operating mind, does not breach the right to silence.  
See also R. v. Roy, [2003] O.J. No. 4252, 180 C.C.C. (3d) 298, at 302-303 (Ont. C.A.). 
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Consequently, accused persons ought to be advised, not just of their 
right to remain silent, but how to exercise that right. 
Everything that has been discussed above is a pre-condition to the 
commencement of an interview or interrogation. A further obligation 
sometimes arises once questioning has commenced. If the reasons for 
the detainee’s detention change during questioning, the informational 
and implementational duties are triggered once again. This may occur 
when the accused’s jeopardy changes (for example, when an assault victim 
dies and the charge is upgraded to a homicide),22 or when the investigation 
turns in the direction of other offences for which the detained person 
was not initially arrested.23 
The only rule to emanate from section 10(b) of the Charter that 
impacts on the substance of police questioning arises from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in R. v. Burlingham.24 The accused was detained by the 
police and was being questioned on a charge of murder. The accused 
stood by his right to remain silent. Among other tactics, police made 
“repeated disparaging comments … about defence counsel’s loyalty, 
commitment, availability, as well as the amount of his legal fees”.25 The 
Court held that this conduct was improper. In particular, Iacobucci J. 
addressed the nature of the interrogation insofar as it related to the 
accused’s lawyer: 
. . . s. 10(b) specifically prohibits the police, as they did in this case, 
from belittling an accused’s lawyer with the express goal or effect of 
undermining the accused’s confidence in and relationship with defence 
counsel. It makes no sense for s. 10(b) of the Charter to provide for 
the right to retain and instruct counsel if law enforcement authorities 
are able to undermine either an accused’s confidence in his or her lawyer 
or the solicitor-client relationship.26 
All other limitations imposed by section 10(b) focus on the external 
parameters for interrogation, conditions-precedent for questioning. 
Burlingham stands as an exception because it prohibits a specific line of 
questioning. 
                                                                                                            
22
 See R. v. Black, [1989] S.C.J. No. 81, 50 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).  
23
 See R. v. Evans, [1991] S.C.J. No. 31, 63 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Borden, 
[1994] S.C.J. No. 82, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 404 (S.C.C.).  
24
 [1995] S.C.J. No. 39, 97 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).  
25
 R. v. Burlingham, [1995] S.C.J. No. 39, 97 C.C.C. (3d) 385, at 393 (S.C.C.). 
26
 R. v. Burlingham, [1995] S.C.J. No. 39, 97 C.C.C. (3d) 385, at 397 (S.C.C.). 
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The right to silence, recognized to be an aspect of section 7 of the 
Charter,27 is sometimes resorted to in the interrogation context. Section 7 
is typically28 asserted in circumstances of persistent questioning by the 
police, after section 10(b) compliance, but in the face of assertions by 
the detained person that he or she wishes to exercise his or her right to 
silence. Success on this basis has been mixed.29 More recently, judges 
have approached this question by exploring the connection between the 
common law confessions rule and the right to silence in section 7 of the 
Charter. In R. v. Roy,30 Doherty J. observed that “[t]he trial judge clearly 
linked the voluntariness argument and the claim that the appellant had 
been denied his right to silence. That link exists both in and on the facts 
of this case.”31 Ultimately, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial 
judge that, under the rubric of the common law confessions rule, the 
accused had not been deprived of his right to choose whether to remain 
silent. 
More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada in Singh32 has finally 
addressed this issue, which has been percolating in the jurisprudence of 
some appellate courts for many years. Mr. Singh was charged with first 
degree murder. After consulting with counsel, he advised the police that 
he did not wish to make a statement. The police persisted in the face of 
many more protestations from the accused that he wished to remain 
silent. The trial judge found that his subsequent admissions to the police 
were voluntary. This conclusion was affirmed by the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal.33 In a 5:4 split, the Supreme Court upheld this decision. 
The majority held that, when an accused person is in detention and is 
speaking to a person that he or she knows is a person in authority, the 
confessions rule “effectively subsumes” the right to silence.34 In this 
                                                                                                            
27
 See R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, 77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.), R. v. Broyles, [1991] 
S.C.J. No. 95, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Liew, [1999] S.C.J. No. 51, 137 C.C.C. (3d) 
353 (S.C.C.). The right to silence is also reflected in other sections of the Charter, including s. 11(c) 
(right not to be compelled to be a witness) and s. 13 (right against self-incrimination). 
28
 R. c. Otis, [2000] J.Q. no 4320, 37 C.R. (5th) 320 (Que. C.A.). 
29
 See the discussion of this body of law in Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian 
Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2005), at 128-29. See also Guy 
Cournoyer, “Saying ‘No’ to Interrogation: The Quebec Court of Appeal Asserts a Meaningful Right 
to Silence” (2001) 37 C.R. (5th) 342. 
30
 [2004] O.J. No. 4252, 15 C.R. (6th) 282 (Ont. C.A.). 
31
 R. v. Roy, [2004] O.J. No. 4252, 15 C.R. (6th) 282, at 285-86 (S.C.C.). For commentary 
on this case, see Guy Cournoyer, “Annotation: R. v. Roy” (2003) 15 C.R. (6th) 283.  
32
 R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.). 
33
 R. v. Singh, [2006] B.C.J. No. 1274, 38 C.R. (6th) 217 (B.C.C.A.). 
34
 R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 39 (S.C.C.).  
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context, the two tests (i.e., whether the right to silence has been infringed 
and whether the voluntariness test is satisfied) are “functionally 
equivalent”.35 As Charron J. (McLachlin C.J.C. and Bastarache, Deschamps 
and Rothstein JJ., concurring) explained for the majority: 
 Therefore, voluntariness, as it is understood today, requires that 
the court scrutinize whether the accused was denied his or her right to 
silence. The right to silence is defined in accordance with constitutional 
principles. A finding of voluntariness will therefore be determinative 
of the s. 7 issue. In other words, if the Crown proves voluntariness 
beyond a reasonable doubt, there can be no finding of a Charter violation 
of the right to silence in respect of the same statement. The converse 
holds true as well. If the circumstances are such that an accused is able 
to show on a balance of probabilities a breach of his or her right to silence, 
the Crown will not be in a position to meet the voluntariness test.36 
Essentially, persistent questioning in the face of insistence on silence 
is an inquiry into whether the accused “exercised free will by choosing 
to make a statement”,37 which, as discussed in the next part, is at the 
heart of the voluntariness doctrine. The majority could not find error with 
the trial judge’s conclusion that Mr. Singh’s will was not overborne by 
the persistence of the police. 
In a dissenting judgment, Fish J. (Binnie, LeBel and Abella JJ., 
concurring) held that Mr. Singh’s rights under section 7 of the Charter 
were violated by the persistent questioning of the police. Quoting from 
Hebert,38 the dissenters held that the police “unfairly frustrated [Mr. 
Singh’s] decision on the question of whether to make a statement to  
the authorities”.39 In doing so, Fish J. rejected the contention that the 
protections articulated in Hebert were restricted to detainees who were 
dealing with undercover officers or other detainees.40 The dissenters also 
                                                                                                            
35
 R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 39 (S.C.C.). The majority did 
recognize that s. 7 offers a residual protection in certain circumstances, such as when the accused 
person is dealing with an undercover officer.  
36
 R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 37 (S.C.C.). 
37
 R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 53 (S.C.C.).  
38
 R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, 77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.). 
39
 R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 63 (S.C.C.). Square brackets 
inserted in original text.  
40
 After quoting from R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, 77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.), Fish J. 
held at para. 62: 
Nothing in either passage, or elsewhere in Hebert, suggests that McLachlin J. limited the 
right of silence under s. 7 of the Charter to statements made by a detainee to undercover 
police officers or to other detainees. On the contrary, in determining its scope on a principled 
basis, Justice McLachlin dealt with the right to silence in the context of statements made  
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found that Mr. Singh’s right to counsel was “collaterally” infringed in 
the circumstances by the officer’s comments about his counsel’s advice 
to remain silent.41 More fundamentally, Fish J. held that the protection 
afforded by section 7 of the Charter is not subsumed within the confessions 
rule and that a confession that is otherwise voluntary may still, in some 
circumstances, infringe section 7 of the Charter.42 
For those hoping for more robust protections against interrogation, 
Singh43 will be a disappointment. However, this paper does not dwell 
upon the issue of whether there should be greater or lesser procedural 
safeguards for those interrogated by the police. For present purposes, 
Singh is important because it demonstrates that the scope of protection 
may be modulated within the confines of the common law confessions 
rule (albeit, a rule, the contemporary incarnation of which is imbued with 
Charter values). 
III. VOLUNTARINESS AND THE CHARTER 
The Supreme Court of Canada has addressed the substantive content 
of the common law confessions rule on many occasions prior to the 
entrenchment of the Charter. After 1982, the issue has arisen for 
consideration in only a handful of cases. Earlier treatments by the Court44 
may have supported the assertion that the “confessions rule has attained 
some indeterminate constitutional status under the Charter”.45 The 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions have perpetuated this indeterminate 
status. In R. v. Oickle,46 perhaps one of the most important Canadian 
criminal cases in many years, the Court purported to cut ties between the 
                                                                                                            
“to the police” or “to the authorities” by detainees under interrogation. And she dealt with 
it as a constitutional right not subsumed by the common law confessions rule. (emphasis in 
the original) 
The majority interpreted Hebert more narrowly, restricting it to circumstances in which the accused 
person was unaware that he/she was speaking to a person in authority: see paras. 46-47.  
41
 R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 62 (S.C.C.).  
42
 R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at paras. 73-78 (S.C.C.).  
43
 R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.). 
44
 See R. v. Whittle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 69, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 11 (S.C.C.), in which Sopinka J. 
said at 24: “While the confession rule and the right to silence originate in the common law, as 
principles of fundamental justice they have acquired constitutional status under s. 7 of the Charter.” 
This passage was quoted by Bastarache J. in R. v. G. (B.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 29, 135 C.C.C. (3d) 303, 
at 318 (S.C.C.). 
45
 Lisa Dufraimont, “The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current Law 
and Future Directions”, in this volume, at 249. 
46
 [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.). 
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Charter and the voluntariness rule. As discussed above, Singh47 purports 
to re-establish some link between the two, but in a manner that will have 
little practical impact on substantive outcomes in terms of the admissibility 
of statements. 
In Oickle,48 the Court imposed further structure on the developing 
common law confessions rule, clarifying the various categories of 
involuntariness, and elaborating on the role of oppressive circumstances 
in undermining the voluntariness of statements.49 The Court also considered 
the social-legal context in which the present law operates,50 as well as 
the values embodied in the dynamic common law rule. Writing for the 
majority, Iacobucci J. confirmed that the rule is concerned with ensuring 
the reliability of statements (i.e., weeding out false confessions), but also 
“protection of the accused’s rights and fairness in the criminal process”.51 
In terms of fairness, the Court touched on the issue of the right to silence, 
holding that the confessions rule can provide appropriate protection: 
Voluntariness is the touchstone of the confessions rule. Whether the 
concern is threats or promises, the lack of an operating mind, or police 
trickery that unfairly denies the accused’s right to silence, this Court’s 
jurisprudence has consistently protected the accused from having 
involuntary confessions introduced into evidence. If a confession is 
involuntary for any of these reasons, it is inadmissible.52 (emphasis added) 
This provided explicit confirmation that the common law confessions 
rule is capable of accommodating right to silence claims. 
The Oickle53 Court also faced the question of whether the future 
development of the confessions rule would be best entrusted to the 
Charter. This was prompted by the Court’s earlier decision in Hebert,54 
in which McLachlin J. (as she then was) interpreted the right to silence in 
light of the common law confessions rule. The Oickle Court considered 
                                                                                                            
47
 R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.). 
48
 R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.). 
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the corresponding question of whether the Charter should subsume the 
rule. Justice Iacobucci rejected this position: 
 But I do not believe that this view is correct, for several reasons. 
First, the confessions rule has a broader scope than the Charter. For 
example, the protections of s. 10 only apply “on arrest or detention”. 
By contrast, the confessions rule applies whenever a person in 
authority questions a suspect. Second, the Charter applies a different 
burden and standard of proof from that under the confessions rule. 
Under the former, the burden is on the accused to show, on a balance 
of probabilities, a violation of constitutional rights. Under the latter, 
the burden is on the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the confession was voluntary. Finally, the remedies are different. The 
Charter excludes evidence obtained in violation of its provisions under  
s. 24(2) only if admitting the evidence would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute: see R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, R. v. 
Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, and the related jurisprudence. By 
contrast, a violation of the confessions rule always warrants exclusion. 
 These various differences illustrate that the Charter is not an 
exhaustive catalogue of rights. Instead, it represents a bare minimum 
below which the law must not fall. A necessary corollary of this 
statement is that the law, whether by statute or common law, can offer 
protections beyond those guaranteed by the Charter. The common law 
confessions rule is one such doctrine, and it would be a mistake to 
confuse it with the protections given by the Charter. While it may be 
appropriate, as in Hebert, supra, to interpret one in light of the other, it 
would be a mistake to assume one subsumes the other entirely.55 
The majority in Singh recognized these same relative benefits56 and 
held that, instead of the confessions rule being subsumed by the Charter, 
“the confessions rule effectively subsumes the constitutional right to silence 
in circumstances where an obvious person in authority is interrogating a 
person who is in detention.”57 In these circumstances, the two tests are 
“functionally equivalent”.58 
On Iacobucci J.’s analysis, there are considerable benefits to addressing 
the limits of interrogation through the common law. The most profound 
benefits are reflected in the burden and standard of proof. Apart from 
the adjudication on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence, there is no 
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other juncture in the criminal process where proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is the standard of proof. Combined with the burden of proof, all 
an accused person need do is raise a reasonable doubt that the statement 
was involuntary on any of the grounds recognized in Oickle.59 Moreover, 
the Crown must adduce evidence to show the full context in which the 
statement was made, which generally involves calling the evidence of 
all persons in authority who came into contact with the accused leading 
up to the making of the statement.60 By contrast, on a Charter motion, 
the accused bears the burden of proof, on a balance of probabilities, on 
the issues of both breach and remedy.61 
When Iacobucci J. wrote, it was debatable whether the differing 
remedial frameworks (common law versus the Charter) favoured 
adjudication under the common law. It is true that a finding of 
involuntariness mandates the exclusion of evidence. However, at the time 
Oickle62 was decided, when conscriptive evidence (a statement being the 
paradigmatic example) was found to be taken in violation of Charter 
rights, exclusion was virtually automatic.63 However, the circumstances 
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under which conscriptive evidence is excluded has since become less 
clear, with change potentially on the horizon. If the law moves at all on 
this issue, there is only room to move in a manner that would make the 
automatic exclusion remedy under the common law more favourable. 
Another reason, not advanced in Oickle64 or Singh,65 for keeping the 
common law rule separate from the Charter relates to preliminary 
inquiries. While the provisions relating to the conduct of preliminary 
inquiries have been amended to streamline the process,66 in order to 
introduce the statement of the accused into evidence at a preliminary 
inquiry, the Crown must still establish that the statement is voluntary.67 
Conversely, the Charter does not apply at a preliminary inquiry. In a 
ruling that came after Oickle (but before Singh), the Supreme Court in 
R. v. Hynes68 held that a judge conducting a preliminary inquiry is not a 
court of competent jurisdiction and, as such, has no power to exclude a 
statement obtained in violation of s. 10(b) of the Charter.69 Therefore, 
subsuming the confessions rule within the Charter might have the result 
of constricting the ambit of the confessions rule by excluding its application 
from preliminary inquiries. Alternatively, subsuming the common law 
within the Charter could result in the undesirable development of two 
versions of the confessions rule, a purely common law version applicable 
at the preliminary inquiry, and a Charter-based version at trial. 
One complaint about the common law confessions rule is that it fails 
to impose clear limits on the police.70 Others have suggested that Oickle71 
has done the opposite and has created a “recipe” or list of coercive 
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techniques.72 It is unrealistic to expect bright lines in this area. In Oickle, 
the Court favoured a contextual approach, holding that: 
Hard and fast rules simply cannot account for the variety of circumstances 
that vitiate the voluntariness of a confession, and would inevitably 
result in a rule that would be both over- and under-inclusive. A trial 
judge should therefore consider all the relevant factors when reviewing 
a confession.73 
Singh74 too fails to impose any bright-line distinctions in this context. 
Beyond the theoretical debate between the majority and minority 
judgments in Singh, all judges accepted the proposition that persistent 
questioning by police officers, in the face of an assertion of the right to 
remain silent, may trigger the operation of the common law confessions 
rule or the right to silence, as the case may be. However, Singh provides 
little guidance on where to draw the line. Oickle75 establishes that the 
common law confessions rule is dynamic, capable of changing to the 
realities of modern police investigations. Singh confirms that the rule 
vindicates right to silence claims. Even if the Supreme Court could be 
persuaded to develop “hard and fast rules” in this area, and working on 
the debatable assumption that this is desirable, clarity is achieved just as 
effectively within the confines of the common law rule, without drawing 
upon the Charter. Indeed, Parliament could establish clear guidelines 
and ground rules for interrogation.76 
The types of complaints made in the right to silence cases involve 
policy choices about the proper role of the police in the interrogation 
process. If the law is developed to provide greater protection to detainees 
whose assertions of the right to remain silent are ignored by the police, 
it is unlikely that “hard and fast” rules will emerge as a response to this 
situation. Like many questions concerning interrogation, a contextual 
approach seems more sensible. The dynamic common law confessions 
rule seems ideally suited to this task. There is nothing inherent in the 
Charter that promises to deliver greater or more clearly defined protections. 
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Singh77 proves this point. The resolution of the dispute over the 
admissibility of Mr. Singh’s utterances did not turn on the choice of 
analytical frameworks. It was open to the majority to find that the type 
of conduct engaged in by the police undermined the voluntariness of 
Mr. Singh’s utterances. In the end, the majority was not prepared to find 
that the trial judge erred in holding that the conduct of the police did not 
cross the line. Even if the majority had accepted the minority’s more 
robust view of the Charter in this context, it is difficult to envisage the 
majority coming to a different conclusion on the merits. It addressed the 
same question of value, but without the aid of the Charter. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Since 1982, there has been a strong tendency to dispatch all criminal 
law problems directly to the Charter. Admittedly, the Charter has 
revolutionized some aspects of criminal law. However, the Charter is 
not a panacea; it does not automatically prescribe ready-made solutions 
for all perceived shortcomings in the criminal law. In the context of 
confessions, the Charter is accompanied by significant procedural baggage 
that would render relief less accessible. In the end, our law relating to 
the interrogation of suspects engages a complex web of values that 
sometimes conflict.78 Policy options abound and compete for ascendant 
positions. Sensible and well-grounded reforms do not require the currency 
of the Charter to succeed. This has been the experience of Canadian law 
concerning the interrogation of suspects. If the law relating to the 
interrogation of suspects is inadequate, and this is far from apparent, it 
cannot be seriously maintained that this is due to the fact that the 
common law confessions rule has not been subsumed by the Charter. 
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